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The author holds the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Army. He serves in the Judge
Advocate General's Corp as a member of the Army Trial Judiciary and is presently assigned to the
Second Judicial Circuit, with his office at Governor's Island, New York City. Colonel Maguire com-
pleted his undergraduate work at Fordham University in 1939 and was graduated in 1951 from the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, where he was Managing Editor of the Law Review. From
1957 to 1962 he was assigned to The Judge Advocate General's School at Charlottesville, Virginia,
where he served as Chief of the Military Justice Division and taught courses in Evidence and Trial
Technique. During this period Colonel Maguire wrote the official Army text on Evidence, published
by the Government Printing Office in 1961, and the 1962 revised edition. While assigned to the Far
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of Law in Korea. The author has attended the Short Courses for prosecutors and defense counsel
at the Northwestern University School of Law. He is a member of the American Bar Association,
the Order of the Coif, and the Institute of Military Law and is a member of the Bars of Pennsylvania
and the United States Court of Military Appeals.*
Under the exclusionary rule, once evidence is "tainted" because it, in some way, is associated with
a search or seizure made in violation of the fourth amendment, under what circumstances can the
prosecution "untaint" the evidence and establish its admissibility? In the following article, Colonel
Maguire shows that evidence can often be "untainted" where it did not actually result from the
unlawful act, where it resulted in part from the unlawful act, and even where it resulted solely from
that act. The author presents a critical evaluation of the significant decisions in the area and reviews
the special problems involved in the confessions and admissions cases. In addition he analyses the
various tests for "untainting" enunciated in the decisions and formulates a new test for "unpoisoning
the fruit" which is conceived to serve the essential purpose of the exclusionary rule without con-
ferring its benefits indiscriminately wherever "the constable has blundered."-EDIOR.
"We hold that all evidence obtained by searches
and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by
that same authority, inadmissible in a state
court."' These twenty-five simple words, spoken
by the Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio,2 were des-
tined to have a greater impact upon the adminis-
tration of criminal justice by the several states
than any other one pronouncement of the Court.
It is not the purpose of this article to comment
upon the respective merits of the five opinions
handed down in that case,3 or to discuss its pos-
* The opinions and conclusions expressed in this
article are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of The Judge Advocate General's
Corps or any other governmental agency.
1 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
21Iid.
3 Majority opinion of Justice Clark; separate concur-
ring opinions of Justices Black and Douglas; dissenting
opinion of Justice Harlan; memorandum opinion of
Justice Stewart.
sible effect upon the tests for legality of searches
and seizures heretofore applied by the individual
states,4 or the many vexing procedural problems
involved in the implementation of the newly an-
nounced rule.
The decision in Mapp v. Ohio requires the states
to enforce the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures "by the same
sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal
Government."-5 This "same sanction of exclusion"-
as developed in the federal courts requires the sup-
pression, upon timely objection or motion by the
defendant, of all evidence acquired as the result of
an illegal search or seizure as well as any other
4 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960),
presaging the development of a minimum standard of
"reasonableness" of searches and seizures, binding upon
all the states.
5 367 U.S. 655.
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evidence obtained as the result of such illegally
acquired matter and thereby "tainted" by the
initial illegality.' It is the purpose of this article to
determine the precise meaning of the inherently
ambiguous phrase "as a result of" and thereby to
demonstrate that not every fruit of the poisoned
tree is incurably tainted.
THE FEDERAL ExcLusIoNARY RuLE
Simply stated, the purpose of the exclusionary
rule is to ensure full compliance with the fourth
amendment to the Constitution by law enforce-
ment officials. The underlying rationale is that the
civil liability of such officials for tortious invasions
of the personal rights guaranteed by the fourth
amendment has proved inadequate as a sanction
where such invasions can effectively be used by
these officials to assist them in the discharge of
their official responsibilities for the investigation of
crimes and the prosecution of criminals. It is be-
lieved that the exclusionary rule serves not only
to deter unlawful conduct, negligent or otherwise,
in this area but also to provide an added incentive
for full compliance with all applicable rules of law.
It is obvious that the rule confers a substantial
benefit upon the defendant who successfully in-
vokes it, but it is important to keep in mind that
this bonanza is a regrettable by-product of the rule
and not its objective The sole purpose of the rule
is to require compliance with the constitutional
provisions in order to maintain the free society
contemplated by the founding fathers,8 and this is
sought to be accomplished by denying to the
government in a criminal prosecution any advan-
tage which it has obtained because of the wrongful
acts of its agents. Therefore, the exclusionary rule
casts its protective mantle over not only evidence
secured during an unlawful search or seizure but
also all other evidence discovered because of the
unlawful act.9
6 Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920).
7 "Neither the Constitution nor any statute in terms
prohibits the use of the truth, even though unlawfully
discovered, as evidence in the prosecution of a crime;
but it is a federal judicial policy not to allow the agents
and officers of the United States to break the law them-
selves and then use information so acquired to prosecute
others." Noro v. United States, 148 F.2d 696, 699 (5th
Cir. 1949).
8 "All these methods [of illegal search] are outlawed
and convictions obtained by means of them are in-
validated because they encourage the kind of society
that is obnoxious to free men." Walder v. United States,
347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
9 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385 (1920).
A classic example of the "tainting" of evidence
because of a prior illegal act of law enforcement
authorities is found in the situation where informa-
tion obtained during an illegal search thereafter is
used to supply the probable cause for the issuance
of an otherwise valid search warrant. In such a case
all evidence acquired pursuant to the execution of
the warrant is held inadmissible in like manner as
the evidence found originally.
"A federal agent cannot participate in an unlaw-
ful search, and then on the basis of what he ob-
served in the course of that search, and on that
basis alone, go to a United States Commissioner
and swear out a search warrant. Such a search
warrant, and the evidence procured in the course
of a search thereunder, would be merely the
illegal product of a previous unlawful search by
the federal authorities."' 0
Just as an otherwise valid search warrant can be
tainted by a prior unlawful search of which it is
the product, so also can an otherwise legally effec-
tive consent to a search be vitiated by an earlier
unlawful act. Thus, where officers requested per-
mission to search the defendant's car solely be-
cause an earlier illegal search of the car had dis-
closed the presence therein of highly incriminating
matter, the consent of the defendant to the second
search was tainted by the original illegality." The
same reasoning applies to render inadmissible evi-
dence obtained during an otherwise lawful search
incident to the arrest of the defendant where the
arrest itself was the product of a prior unlawful
search."2
ThE Silverthorne AND Wong Sun DicrA
Granted that the federal exclusionary rule oper-
ates against both evidence seized and information
acquired during an unlawful search and so-called
"derivative evidence," it does not follow that such
evidence or information is rendered forever unus-
"0 McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598, 603
(1st Cir. 1955) (federal agent took part in search by
state police under invalid John Doe warrant). Accord,
Hair v. United States, 289 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
(police illegally entered defendant's home while pur-
suing his accomplice); Fraternal Order of Eagles v.
United States, 57 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1932) (prohibition
agents used forged membership cards to gain entry into
private club).
" Mosco v. United States, 301 F.2d 180 (9th Cir.
1962) (first searcher found notebook under seat
cushion with information concerning bank robbery; he
replaced book and after defendant was arrested asked
permission to search car).
12 Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir.
1943).
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able. This concept was first enunciated by the
Supreme Court in 1920 in Silverthorne Lumber
Company v. United States? There the Court was
confronted with a conviction of the corporate de-
fendant for contempt arising out of the failure to
comply with a subpoena for the production of cer-
tain corporate records. The defendant had earlier
established that these records were in the posses-
sion of the government as the direct result of an
unlawful seizure, and the records had been re-
turned to it by court order. The government offi-
cials, however, had made copies of the records and
used these copies as the basis for the issuance of a
subpoena for the originals. The Court set aside the
contempt conviction on the ground that the sub-
poena was the product of the prior seizure, saying:
"The essence of a provision for bidding the acqui-
sition of evidence in a certain way is that not
merely evidence so acquired shall not be used
before the court, but that it shall not be used at
all. Of course this does not mean that the facts
thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible.
If knowledge of them is gained from an inde-
,pendent source they may be proved like any
others, but the knowledge gained by the govern-
ment's own wrong cannot be used by it in the
way proposed."'
4
This principle-that it is possible for the prosecu-
tion to establish that although the evidence which
it proffers may have followed an unlawful search
or seizure, it is not tainted thereby-was again
recognized in the recent case of Wong Sun v. United
States," where the Court stated:
"We need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit of
the poisonous tree' simply because it would not
have come to light but for the illegal actions of
the police. Rather, the more apt question in
such a case is 'whether granting establishment
of the primary illegality, the evidence to which
instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitationof that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint.' "16
Before proceeding to an exploration of the pos-
sible methods by which the prosecution can prove
its evidence to be untainted, it is necessary to
discuss briefly the manner in which the issue is
presented for decision in an actual case. In the
absence of an affirmative claim by the defendant
23 251 U.S. 385.
14 Id. at 392.
15 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
"I Id. at 487, 488, quoting MAGumRE, EVIDENCE Or
GuiLT 221 (1959).
that the prosecution's evidence is rendered inad-
diissible because of a prior illegal search, the
government is not required to prove that the evi-
dence had a lawful origin.'7 However, if the de-
fendant does raise an issue as to the legality of a
search or seizure, the prosecution must assume the
burden of establishing that such action was not
illegal."' If it does not successfully carry this bur-
den, all evidence which the record shows to be
"the product" of the unlawful act is inadmissible.
It is important to note that a finding that a prior
search was illegal does not per se make any evi-
dence inadmissible. Inadmissibility must rest upon
some showing of a possible causal connection be-
tween the search and the proffered evidence?9 To
this end the defendant must be given the oppor-
tunity to explore in detail the circumstances under
which the government acquired the evidence at
issue. In the words of the Supreme Court, he must
be permitted to attempt "to prove that a substan-
tial portion of the case against him was a fruit of
the poisonous tree."" If he so desires he must be
given "an opportunity to examine and re-examine
witnesses at the trial to determine whether evi-
dence derived from leads and dues furnished by
materials.., was used by the prosecution at the
trial."21 If the defendant establishes a reasonable
possibility that the proffered evidence resulted
from the unlawful search or seizure, it is inadmis-
sible unless the prosecution can "convince the trial
court that its proof had an independent origin,""2
or "prove that the information so gained has not
'led', directly or indirectly, to the discovery of any
of the evidence which it introduces."2" This burden
is placed on the government on the theory that
"a wrongdoer who has mingled the consequences
'7 Morton v. United States, 147 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 875 (1945).
18 United States v. Keleher, 2 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir.
1924).
9 Benetti v. United States, 97 F.2d 263 (9th Cir.
1938). See also Johnson v. United States, 290 F.2d 378
(D.C. Cir. 1961).
21 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
Although this case involved illegal wiretapping, the-
exclusionary rule has been applied in that area in
exactly the same manner as with respect to violations of
the fourth amendment. For this reason many other
wiretapping cases are used in the development of this
article.
21 Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 355 (1958)
(alleged illegal source was improper interrogation of
defendant before grand jury).
2Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338,341 (1939).
United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 636 (2d Cir.
1950) (wiretapping). See also United States v. Sansone,
231 F.2d 887 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 987 (1956)
(illegal arrest).
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of lawful and unlawful conduct, has the burden of
disentangling them ... 2
ThE CAUSATION PROBLEM
Granted that, upon a showing by the defendant
that certain evidence possibly is the fruit of a
poisonous tree, the government is given the burden
of removing the taint, what test is to be applied in
determining whether this burden has been carried
successfully? The Silverthorne dictum states that it
is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the
evidence had a source "independent" of the un-
lawful act.25 In a subsequent decision the Court
noted that "in practice this generalized statement
may conceal concrete complexites. ' ' 26 It is the
purpose of this article to grapple with these "con-
crete complexities" in an effort to formulate a
more meaningful test for determining how evidence
may be "untainted."
Exactly what is required of the government? In
the language of the opinions, the prosecution must
prove that its evidence had an "independent
source" 7 or an "independent origin";a that the
connection with the unlawful act has "become so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint";29 that the
unlawfully obtained information "has not 'led',
directly or indirectly, to the discovery" of the
proffered evidence;30 that the evidence was not
"derived from" 3' or "the fruit of"' the tainted
information; that the evidence was not "come at
by the exploitation of that illegality."3 Obviously,
these diverse formulations are all intended to re-
quire severance of a causal connection between the
poisonous tree and its apparent fruit. But precisely
what concept of causation is involved? Is it suffici-
ent that the unlawful act or the information di-
rectly derived therefrom be a contributing cause
toward the discovery of the allegedly tainted evi-
dence? Or must it be the efficient or proximate
24 United States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485, 488 (D.C.
Cir. 1941), aff'd without discussion, 316 U.S. 114 (1942)
(wiretapping).
25 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
26 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341
(1939).
27 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
28 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338,341 (1939).29 
Ibid.
10 United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 636 (2d
Cir. 1950).
31 Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 355 (1958).
32 United States v. Sansone, 231 F.2d 887, 891 (2d
Cir. 1956).
1 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478
(1963).
cause? Assuming that there is in fact a causal con-
nection sufficient to taint the proffered evidence,
can this connection effectively be severed by a
showing that, even if the unlawful act had not oc-
curred, the evidence woudd have been available to
the prosecution from lawful sources? Must the un-
lawful act have been literally a sine qua non of the
discovery of the evidence? Unfortunately, the
courts seem assiduously to have avoided squarely
facing up to these all-important questions. The
answers to them can be found in the reported
cases only by viewing the expressions of legal
principle apparently laid down therein through
the spectacles supplied by the facts of the particular
case.
DE FACTO CAUSATION
One obvious means of eliminating the unlawful
search or seizure as a tainting influence is to es-
tablish that the proffered evidence was, in fact,
discovered as the result not of the unlawful act
but rather of information lawfully known to the
authorities completely independently of that act.
In such a situation one can simply say that the prof-
fered evidence is not the product of the unlawful
act and, hence, is untainted. This principle lends
itself easily to application in the situation where
the proffered evidence consists of "derivative evi-
dence," i.e., not evidence seized or information
acquired during the illegal act but other matter
allegedly discovered as the result of investigative
leads furnished by the illegally obtained informa-
tion. Here the prosecution need only show, for
example, that the proffered evidence was in fact
discovered as the result of a lead completely un-
related to the unlawful act. However, where the
record shows that the very item being offered was
in fact acquired during an unlawful search, a more
difficult problem presents itself. How can one es-
tablish that what was in fact seen or seized during
a search is not its product?
Oddly enough, the solution to this problem is
not overly difficult. Let us assume that a Coast
Guard cutter illegally halts and boards another
ship on the high seas. During this operation the
federal agents see several cases of contraband
whiskey on the deck. It would appear that we have
here a situation where the testimony of the agents
as to the nature of the cargo is tainted by the ille-
gal search and inadmissible. But let us assume fur-
ther that the agents testify that before halting the
"rum runner," they had observed and recognized
[Vol. 55
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the cargo in full view on its deck. We now have a
situation where knowledge of the cargo was ob-
tained lawfully prior to, and therefore necessarily
independently of, the illegal search, and the testi-
mony of the agents is no longer tainted?' Similarly
the illegal destruction of contraband whiskey by
federal agents does not render inadmissible their
testimony as to what they observed during the
execution of a valid search warrant immediately
prior to the illegal act.35 Nor does the illegal sei-
zure by Internal Revenue agents of certain records
require that they be suppressed when the agents
had, prior to the seizure, signed a valid summons
covering the very same records?' Another instance
of the application of this principle is found in Zap
v. United States, l where agents investigating book-
keeping frauds in connection with cost-plus govern-
ment contracts arranged to be present while the
appropriate government officials exercised the
government's contractual right to audit the de-
fendant's books. During this audit, the agents
learned of the existence of a certain check which
had been drawn for a greater amount than actually
was due to the payee. They directed the defendant
to produce the check and carried it away with
them for use as evidence. The Supreme Court
noted that "neither the Fourth nor Fifth Amend-
ment would preclude the agents from testifying at
the trial concerning the facts [re the check] about
which they had lawfully obtained knowledge ....
Even though it be assumed in passing that the tak-
ing of the check was unlawful, that would not
make inadmissible in evidence the knowledge which
had been legally obtained."1'
In each of these instances the evidence is ad-
missible because the prosecution is able to establish
that although it appears to be the product of the
unlaivful act, it is not so in fact. Therefore, the re-
sults in these cases are not inconsistent with the
broad, and deceptively simple, rule that evidence
is tainted if derived from an unlawful search or
seizure-if such be the proper rule. Let us now
consider some situations wherein evidence which
has in fact resulted from an unlawful search or
seizure is nevertheless admissible because the un-
lawful act merely contributed to the discovery of
the evidence.
United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
35 McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95 (1927).
6 Lord v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1963).
37 328 U.S. 624, rehearing denied, 329 U.S. 824 (1946),
vacated, 330 U.S. 800 (1947).
u Id. at 629.
TnE ILLEGAL SEARCH AS A CONTRIBUTING
CAUSE
There are few reported cases involving factual
situations such that the proffered evidence clearly
is the product of both legally and illegally ac-
quired information. A situation which seems tai-
lored to point up the principles here involved ap-
pears in a decision of the United States Court of
Military Appeals.39 While investigating a recent
burglary of an army post exchange, the agents
made a check of the contents of public lockers in
the local train station by peering through existing
openings in the doors. A new suitcase identical in
appearance to the one reported stolen was seen in a
certain locker, and two agents were instructed to
maintain a watch over that locker and arrest any-
one opening it. They exceeded their instructions,
unlawfully obtained entry to the locker, and in-
spected the bag and its contents, which proved to be
several other items taken in the burglary. They
then repacked the bag and returnedit to the locker.
Subsequently, when the accused opened the locker
he was placed under arrest and the bag seized. At
his trial he claimed that all evidence as to the con-
tents of the bag was tainted by the illegal search of
the locker, on the theory that since the arrest itself
had been based upon illegally obtained informa-
tion, the search pursuant to the arrest could pro-
duce only tainted fruit. This contention was re-
jected by the court, which held that the agents had
sufficient probable cause for the arrest wholly apart
from the illegal search, stating simply, "the prior
illegal search did not supply the information which
led to the accused's apprehension." 40 The facts,
however, indicate quite plainly that the illegal
search did "lead to" the arrest in the sense that
it made certain what had been merely "suspected,"
however reasonably, before. It transformed "prob-
able cause" for an arrest into positive knowledge
that the locker contained the stolen goods. To that
extent, at the very least, the arrest was in fact
based upon the illegally obtained knowledge, and
it cannot be said that the search did not contribute-
to the arrest. The vital factor is the clear showing
of record that the arrest would have been made
even if the illegal search had not taken place. The
search was only a contributing cause and not the
effective cause of the arrest. For this reason, a hold-
ing that the evidence discovered as the result of
1 United States v. Ball, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 25, 23 C.M.R.
249 (1957).40Id. at 30, 23 C.M.R. at 254.
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the otherwise lawful arrest is admissible does not
permit the government to profit by the improper
acts of its officials, and the reason for invoking
the exclusionary rule disappears. Here again we
have a forceful reminder that the rule does not
exist for the express purpose of conferring a benefit
upon an individual defendant. Whatever benefit he
receives, and frequently it is a substantial one, is
an unavoidable consequence of the means adopted
by the Supreme Court to compel compliance by
public officials with the provisions of the fourth
amendment.
A situation analogous to that discussed above
was involved in Parts Manufacturing Co. v. Lynch.
4
1
Federal agents had taken from the corporate de-
fendant certain allegedly stolen auto parts. A
federal district court held the seizure illegal and
ordered the goods returned. The victim of the lar-
ceny then had the goods taken into custody under
a writ of replevin based upon an inventory of the
goods made by the federal agents after the first
seizure. The government prosecutor then examined
the goods in custody under the writ and used the
information thereby obtained as a basis for issu-
ance of a search warrant. The defendant claimed
that the search warrant flowed from and was tainted
by the original seizure. The court found the search
warrant to be the product of information known to
the agents prior to and independently of the seizure
and, therefore, untainted, stating:
"Actual examination of the property in the ware-
house, therefore, simply confirmed what affants
already had reasonable cause to believe would
be found .... It is too much to hold that in order
to obliterate the original illegal seizure an other-
wise exemplary procedure must be thrown over
because the government did not close its eyes
and lose track of the stolen goods."42
Here again we have a case in which the illegal act
contributed to the ultimate seizure but where such
seizure would have taken place even if the illegal
act had never occurred.
A dear cut recognition of this principle that in-
admissibility does not result unless the illegal
search is the effective, not merely a contributary,
cause of the discovery of the proffered evidence is
to be found in United States v. Giglion where the
court stated:
"If a revenue agent testifies that the subject
41 129 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 674
(1942).
4 Id. at 843.
4 263 F.2d 410 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 820
(1959).
matter of his testimony came only from a record
obtained in violation of a defendant's constitu-
tional rights it can be suppressed or stricken by
the trial judge. If on the other hand he testifies
that the facts were developed from records law-
fully obtained a jury question may result if
there be conflicting testimony. And if the records
lawfully obtained contained the information or
leads from which the information was subse-
quently obtained there would be no basis for
suppression merely because the same informa-
tion might also have been found in suppressed
records."M
A similar conclusion can be drawn from Rouda
v. United States,4' which involved the alleged taint-
ing of a search warrant by a prior illegal search.
The record showed that a prohibition agent had a
certain building under surveillance as a suspected
source of illicit whiskey. He saw a man carrying
two five gallon cans of what appeared to be alcohol
enter the building, and he followed the man inside
where he observed the defendants filling whiskey
bottles. The agent arrested them and then secured
a search warrant for the whiskey based upon his
affidavit to the above facts. The court held the
arrest to have been lawful and then added that
even if it were not, the search warrant was un-
tainted. Speaking through judge Learned Hand,
the Court stated:
"At the outset we note that, except for tasting
the alcohol, Sassie could have learned, and per-
haps did learn, all that he put in the affidavit,
while he stood outside. As the affidavit would
have equally supported the warrant without the
allegation that he tasted the alcohol, the question
arises whether it makes any difference even if
his entry was unlawful. He gained by it no more
than was available to him before entry. It is
therefore at best extremely doubtful whether he
can be said to be profiting by his unlawful entry,
in the sense that the rule requires in order to
have the evidence incompetent. That point we
only raise, lest it be thought we imply the op-
posite.
4
To the same effect is Monroe v. United States,'
wherein it was held that even if police officers had
unlawfully intercepted certain telephone calls made
4Id. at 413 (dictum). (Emphasis added.) The court
upheld the denial of an application coram nobis for a new
trial.
45 10 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1926).
46 Id. at 918.
47 234 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 893,
rehearing denied, 352 U.S. 937 (1956).
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by the defendant, any taint upon the information
thereby obtained was removed by evidence that
the other party to the calls had personally re-
ported the substance of the conversations to the
authorities.4
Other examples of this principle in action are
found in situations where the illegally obtained
information is used together with other, lawfully
acquired, evidence in perfecting the government's
case or otherwise preparing for trial. In all of these
cases the illegally obtained information is viewed
as being merely a contributing cause and does not
taint the evidence which it helps to produce.49 Thus
the testimony of a witness concerning a telephone
conversation to which he was a party is not ren-
dered inadmissible merely because prior to taking
the stand he used an illegally obtained recording
of the conversation to refresh his memory. "[Slince
he was himself the recipient of the messages, or a
participant in the conversations, the connection
between any possible violation of the statute and
his testimony had 'become so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint' in its relation to admissibil-
ity." Similarly, the testimony of accomplices of
the defendant is not tainted merely because il-
legally obtained recordings of telephone conversa-
tions were used, together with other information,
during the interrogation which resulted in their
confessions."
A striking application of this same principle
appears in Warren v. Hawaii.2 A policeman gained
entry to a suspected brothel by posing as a client
and then blew a whistle as a prearranged signal to
his brother officers outside to break in. As the
first raider appeared in the doorway, the defendant
threw a switch which activated an electrical device
Nired to the door and the policeman was electro-
cuted. The following day, the authorities searched
the house without a warrant and removed the
electric "trap." The defendant claimed that the
use of this physical evidence during the pre-trial
interrogation of the brothel employees rendered
their testimony inadmissible at the trial. The court
rejected this contention on the theory that the in-
48 Id. at 57.
9 This principle also applies generally where the de-
fendant's confession is allegedly tainted by the use of
illegally acquired information. However, this situation
does create special problems which are considered sepa-
rately infra.
10 Monroe v. United States, 234 F.2d 49, 57 (D.C.
Cir.), cerl. denied, 352 U.S. 893, rehearing denied, 352
U.S. 937 (1956).
51 United States v. Weiss, 34 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y.
1940).
2 119 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1941).
terrogations were "also" based upon the first hand
knowledge of the electrocution possessed by other
members of the raiding party."
These authorities make it plain that the exclu-
sionary rule does not come into play merely be-
cause the proffered evidence is in fact the product
of an illegal act. If the prosecution can establish
that the illegal act merely contributed to the dis-
covery of the allegedly tainted information and
that such information would have been acquired
lawfully even if the illegal act had never transpired,
the presumptive taint is removed, and the appar-
ently poisoned fruit is made whole. In other words,
if the government establishes that the illegal act
was not an indispensable cause of the discovery of
the proffered evidence, the exclusionary rule does
not apply.
TB1 SiNm QuA Nox TEST
Earlier, it was pointed out that it is essential to
the application of the federal exclusionary rule to
keep constantly in mind that the benefit which it
gives to a specific defendant is an unavoidable, and
regrettable, consequence of the rule and not its
purpose. This purpose frequently is stated to be to
encourage full recognition of the fourth amend-
ment by the authorities by "punishing" them when
they violate its provisions. This formulation is
somewhat misleading because it fails to include
any reference to the one specific form which this
"punishment" may take, viz., refusal by the courts
to allow the authorities to use in a criminal prose-
cution evidence which they would not have ob-
tained if the violation had not taken place. In
other words, the sanction is limited to preventing
the authorities from "profiting" by their official
misconduct. It does not extend so far as to allow
an otherwise guilty defendant to go free merely
because he has been the victim of an unlawful
search or seizure. In the language of the Supreme
Court, "A criminal prosecution is more than a
game in which the government may be check-
mated and the game lost merely because its officers
have not played according to rule."8 4
This is the factor that permits the government
to remove the taint from otherwise poisoned fruit
by establishing that the unlawful act from which
it resulted was not a sine qua non of its discovery.
53 "[Klnowledge of facts gained from a proper inde-
pendent source such as here obtained may be used,
though it also may be obtained from an illegal act."
Id. at 938.
51 McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99 (1927)
(illegal destruction of whiskey after legal seizure).
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As Judge Learned Hand so aptly stated, evidence
is excluded by the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doc-
trine only because it "would not have been found
if officials had not violated the laws designed to
deny them access to it.""5 What is the precise
meaning of this phrase "would not have been
found"? How is it applied in the situation where
the proffered evidence was in fact discovered solely
as the result of an illegal search or seizure?
Earlier, we examined the tests applied where
the allegedly tainted evidence is shown to be the
joint product of an unlawful act and legally ac-
quired information and concluded that such a
showing removes the taint. Let us now assume a
situation where the record shows, and correctly
so, that the evidence challenged by the defendant
originally was acquired by the authorities as the
direct result of an unlawful search which was the
sole effective cause of its discovery and that in the
interval between the search and the trial of the issue
the prosecution has not acquired the same evidence
from legitimate sources of information." In other
words, let us assume a situation where there is no
doubt that the proffered evidence was and has re-
mained the fruit of the poisoned tree. Is it possible
at this late date for the prosecution to "unpoison"
the fruit? The reported cases indicate that this
can be done by establishing that the original illegal
act literally was not a sine qua non of the dis-
covery of the proffered evidence.
In Coplon v. United States7 the defendant, a
federal government employee, contended that
certain documents and testimony were tainted by
a prior illegal wiretap. The facts indicated that by
means of a tap placed on her telephone line be-
cause she was suspected of violations of national
security, federal agents learned that she planned
to take a certain train from the District of Colum-
bia to New York City. As a direct result of this
information she was followed until she kept a
rendezvous in New York at which time she was
55 United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 640 (2d
Cir. 1950). (Emphasis added.)
56 See United States v. Sheba Bracelets, 248 F.2d 134
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 904 (1957), where any
taint arising from the seizure of defendant's books was
removed by evidence that the same books later came
lawfully into the possession of internal revenue agents
who delivered them to the prosecutor. See also Lawn v.
United States, 355 U.S. 339, 355 (1958), concerning the
removal of taint from a certain check by a showing that
a lawfully obtained copy of the same check was in the
possession of the federal authorities at the time of the
trial.
57 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 920 (1952).
arrested and the proffered documents found on
her person. The record thus showed a dear causal
connection between the wiretap and the arrest suffi-
cient to taint the search incident to the arrest.
The government did not show that its agents had
in fact used any legally obtained information in
addition to that derived from the wiretap. Nor did
it establish that the proffered evidence was other-
wise obtained from lawful sources. The evidence
offered by it to remove the taint showed only that
she had informed her supervisor of the departure
time of her train and its destination and that he
knew she was under investigation. The prosecution
did not show that the supervisor had informed the
agents of her projected trip. Nevertheless, the
court held the evidence admissible, stating rather
simply: "None of this evidence could have been
the result of intercepted telephone conversations.
It may be that the agents learned through wire-
tapping of the appellant's intentions to make the
journey to New York City... but this informa-
tion was also given to Foley [the supervisor] by
the appellant herself."63 This language becomes
puzzling when viewed in the light of the facts as
stated in the opinion. These show rather clearly
that the agents acted upon the basis of the wiretap
alone. How then could the court find that "none
of the evidence could have been the result of" the
illegal act? This statement becomes meaningful
only if interpreted to imply a finding that the arrest
would have been made even if the wiretap had not
occurred. Under the facts of the case, such a finding
could rest only upon a determination that, if the
wiretap had not informed the agents of the prospec-
tive trip, they would have questioned the super-
visor and received the same information from him.
It seems, therefore, that the fruit was "unpoisoned"
by a finding that it would have been discovered
even if the unlawful act had never taken place.
A more overt recognition of this principle is
found in Sullivan v. United States,59 where the de-
fendant claimed that evidence of a narcotics of-
fense had been discovered as the result of the un-
lawful interception of a telephone conversation. It
was established that the police had learned of the
impending sale of heroin by listening in on a tele-
phone call made to the defendant by an informer
who made the call at the request of the police. The
trial court found no illegality in this procedure. 60
58 Id. at 757.
219 F.2d 760 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
60 116 F. Supp. 480 (D.D.C. 1953). Judge Holtzoff
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On appeal, the circuit court held that even if the
interception had been illegal, the evidence dis-
covered solely as the result thereof was nevertheless
admissible. This holding was based upon an ex-
plicit finding that if the police had not listened in
on the call, they would have questioned the in-
former, who made the call in their presence, and
been informed by him as to the details of the
planned sale.
The sine qua non test was also utilized in Smner
v. United States.6 There it appeared that during a
search of defendant's apartment by federal agents
they were told by his wife that he was expected
home in a short time. Acting on this information,
the agents waited outside the building and arrested
him when he drove up. A search of his car produced
large quantities of sugar and contraband alcohol.
The trial court held the search of the apartment
illegal but admitted evidence as to the contents of
the car as having been obtained during a lawful
search incident to the arrest. The circuit court held
that on these facts the arrest, and therefore the
subsequent search of the car, were the product of
and tainted by the prior illegal search. However, it
expressly recognized the possibility that the prose-
cution could remove the taint.
"[I]t does not follow that the seizure was inevi-
tably invalid. Possibly, further inquiry will show
that, quite independently of what Somer's wife
told them, the officers would have gone to the
street, have waited for Somer and arrested him
exactly as they did. If they can satisfy the court
of this, so that it appears that they did not need
the information, the seizure may have been law-
ful. The proceeding will therefore be remanded
with leave to the prosecution to retry the issue
in accordance with the foregoing."62
In these situations the prosecution is required to
show that it would have obtained the otherwise
tainted evidence even if the unlawful act had not
occurred. The significance of the word "would"
cannot be overemphasized. It is not enough to
show that the evidence "might" or "could" have
been otherwise obtained. Once the illegal act is
shown to have been in fact the sole effective
cause of the discovery of certain evidence, such
evidence is inadmissible unless the prosecution
anticipated the subsequent holding of Rathbun v.
United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957), that the Federal
Communications Act does not prohibit listening to a
telephone call by means of an existing extension with
the consent of either party to the call.
61 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943).
c Id. at*792. (Emphasis added.)
severs the causal connection by an affirmative
showing that it would have acquired the evidence
in any event. In order to avoid the exclusionary
rule, the government must establish that it has not
benefitted by the illegal acts of its agents; a show-
mng. that it might not have so benefitted is insuffi-
cient.
Unfortunately, language can be found in some
opinions which appears to support the principle
that a showing that the government "could" have
found the otherwise tainted evidence is sufficient.
However, dose examination of the facts as reported
in these cases reveals that the government did es-
tablish that it would and not merely could have
obtained the evidence. In United States v. O'Brien,
2
the defendant had been lawfully arrested in dose
proximity to a locked truck containing stolen goods
and at that time denied any connection with it.
The arresting officer persuaded the defendant to
give him the keys to the truck, which proved to be
in the defendant's pocket, by promising to report
that the keys had been found in the street. The
court held that even if it be assumed that the
method of obtaining the keys would otherwise
render inadmissible the evidence derived there-
from, the taint was removed by the showing of
record that "since Keating was under arrest for
probable cause for the commission of a felony, the
police officers had a right to search him and they
could have found the keys on such authorized
search."6 4 It seems rather obvious that since the
officer already knew that the truck contained
stolen goods and had reasonable grounds to sus-
pect the defendant of a connection with it, a re-
fusal by him to surrender the keys would have led
inevitably to his being searched. Since the keys
were in fact on his person, the search would have
produced the keys. Therefore, the prosecution did
carry its burden of showing that even if the as-
sumedly illegal act had not occurred, the evidence
would have been obtained.
In Parts Manufacturing Co. v. Lynxh, 65 the de-
fendant contended that a search warrant was the
product of a prior illegal seizure. The evidence es--
tablished that the warrant had in fact been issued
in reliance upon a detailed inventory of certain
stolen goods made while they were in custody
under the illegal seizure. The court indicated its
belief that the warrant was not tainted because de-
- 174 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1949).
6 Id. at 346. (Emphasis added.)




tailed information concerning the stolen goods was
available to the government from their owner and
therefore an affidavit sufficient to support the
warrant "could easily have been supplied" without
actual examination of the goods. 66 Here again, close
examination of the reported facts supports the con-
clusion that the warrant would have been obtained
in any event. The investigators knew the location
of the goods and did have sufficient information to
obtain an untainted warrant. Obviously, they
would have done so had not the illegal seizure
intervened.
Similar reasoning explains an apparent holding
by another circuit court that the prosecution can
"untaint" evidence merely by showing that it
could have obtained the same evidence from lawful
sources. This opinion appeared in a case where the
court held illegal a raid by Treasury Department
agents which resulted in the seizure of certain rec-
ords of the corporate defendant. It ordered the re-
turn of the records to the defendant, but denied the
motion to suppress the information learned there-
from. The denial appears to be based upon a find-
ing that, since under Treasury Department regula-
tions governing the manufacture of alcohol, the
agents could have inspected the records upon the
defendant's premises, the taint of the illegal seizure
was inoperative. "But the removal from the prem-
ises of papers which government agents were, under
the circumstances, entitled to inspect upon the
premises did not render sacrosanct information
secured from the papers because it was lawfully
open to the government."67 In and of itself this
statement appears to recognize the rather startling
principle that otherwise tainted evidence is ren-
dered admissible by a mere showing that it was
available to the officials from legitimate sources.
However, if it is read in conjunction with the sen-
tence that follows it, it becomes dear that such
was not the intent of the court. That sentence
reads: "It is only knowledge gained by the govern-
ment's own wrong which cannot be used."" There-
fore, the government must establish that it has
not in fact benefitted from the wrongful act, which
can be done only by a showing that discovery of
the proffered evidence was inevitable.
A clear-cut recognition of the significant distinc-
66 Id. at 842. (Emphasis added.) This comment is
obiter since the court, in effect, held that the illegal
seizure only contributed to the warrant and was not its
sole effective cause.
67 In re Sano Labs., 115 F.2d 717, 718 (3d Cir. 1940),
cert. denied, 312 U.S. 688 (1941).
68 Ibid.
tion between "would" and "could" is found in
United States v. Paroutian,69 a prosecution for deal-
ing in narcotics. Certain evidence crucial to the case
had been acquired under the following circum-
stances. Treasury Department agents received in-
formation from Interpol that X, a suspected nar-
cotics smuggler, was using a certain apartment in
New York City to store smuggled drugs. The
agents searched the apartment with the active co-
operation of the rental agent for the building. Dur-
ing the search the rental agent called the attention
of the searchers to a cedarwood lining in a clothes
closet and told them that it must have been in-
stalled by X. They tried unsuccessfully to remove
this lining. Two days later they returned and re-
sumed the search, at which time they found papers
indicating that the defendant was a co-tenant of
the apartment. Two months later, and after X had
been evicted by the landlord for nonpayment of
rent, the federal agents returned and, with the
consent of the owner, removed the cedarwoodpanel-
ing from the closet, thereby revealing a cache of
heroin and an incriminating letter in the defend-
ant's handwriting. All members of the court agreed
that the first two searches were illegal and that
these illegal acts were in fact the effective cause of
the third search, but they differed as to whether
the evidence was sufficient to remove the taint.
The majority rejected the government's conten-
tion that the evidence showed that the agents
would have conducted the last search even if the
prior illegal ones had not occurred, finding a show-
ing of no more than a possibility that this would
have happened.
"[A] showing that the government had sufficient
independent information available so that in the
normal course of events it might have discovered
the questioned evidence without an illegal search
cannot excuse the illegality or cure tainted mat-
ter .... The test must be one of actualities, not
possibilities .... As the government failed to
show any source for its information other than
the illegal search... [it was error not to sup-
press the evidence]."70
The dissenter appeared to disagree with the rejec-
tion by the majority of the "might have" test,
stating at one point that the government need only
01 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962).
70 Id. at 489. (Emphasis added.) The conviction was
set aside. At the new trial, the Government was per-
mitted to offer additional evidence on the matter and
established that the third search was based upon in-
formation supplied by an undercover agent. United
States v. Paroutian, 319 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1963).
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'show that the evidence was available through a
completely independent source."m However, he
subsequently indicated to the contrary that his
disagreement was on the interpretation of the facts
and did not extend to the legal principles involved.
As he viewed the facts, they dearly showed that
the third search would have been made, solely on
the basis of the letter from Interpol, even without
any information supplied by the illegal searches.
"A realistic appraisal of the facts... compels the
conclusion that the narcotics would have been
found on June 19th, even if there had not been a
search on April 18th."7
An apt illustration of successful taint-removing
appears in Wayne v. United States.n There the de-
fendant, charged with attempted abortion termi-
nating in death, maintained that the autopsy report
on the victim and expert testimony as to the cause
of her death were the product of an unlawful entry
by the police into his apartment. The evidence
established that the victim's sister, who was pres-
ent at and aware of the attempted abortion, became
alarmed at her condition. She fled the scene to
seek help and notified the police through an inter-
mediary that there was an "unconscious woman"
in the defendant's apartment. The police went to
the scene and when their knock upon the door
produced no response they broke down the door
and entered the apartment wherein they found the
defendant and the decedent. On a pre-trial motion,
the district judge held the entry to have been il-
legal. Despite this ruling, the autopsy report and
testimony as to the cause of death were admitted
into evidence at the trial.
A majority of the appellate court held that even
if the search was illegal, the evidence was not
tainted thereby. Looking to the undisputed testi-
ifiony that, prior to the entry by the police into
the apartment, the police had been informed that
the victim was there, the majority found that this
legally acquired information would have led to the
discovery of the allegedly tainted evidence even if
the search had never taken place.
"It was inevitable that, even had the police not
entered appellant's apartment at the time and
in the manner they did, the coroner would
sooner or later have been advised by the police
of the information reported by the sister, would
have obtained the body, and would have con-
ducted the post-mortem examination prescribed
71299 F.2d at 491.
2 Id. at 493. (Emphasis added.)
7J 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
by law .... Thus, the necessary causal relation
between the illegal activity and the evidence
sought to be excluded is lacking in this case.' n4
The Paroutian and Wayne cases point up ad-
mirably the unique nature of the burden of proof
which the prosecution must successfully carry in
order to establish that the illegal act was not a
sine qua non of the discovery of the otherwise
tainted evidence. It must satisfy the court, as a
fact, that the proffered evidence would have been
acquired through lawful sources of information
even if the illegal act had never taken place. Since
such act did in fact occur and, further, did in fact
produce the evidence, this is not a simple task.
However, there are occasions on which it can be
done, as shown by the cases discussed above. One
cannot help but speculate as to the number of
cases in which a proper invocation and application
of these principles might have avoided the unfortu-
nate result of a guilty defendant going free merely
because of the unlawful act of a police officer. The
sine qua non test, if properly administered, serves
well the raison d'etre of the exclusionary rule by
denying to the government the use of evidence
"come at by the exploitation of... illegality" 75
and at the same time minimizes the opportunity
for the defendant to receive an undeserved and
socially undesirable bonanza.78
CONFESSIONS As POISONED FRurT
The exclusionary rule embraces any and all evi-
dence which is the result of an unlawful search or
seizure, including a confession or admission of a
defendant. However, the application of the princi-
ples of causation discussed above poses special
problems when the issue is the tainting of a state-
ment made by the defendant. Such a statement is
inadmissible under other principles of law unless
it was made voluntarily by the defendant.7 There-
fore, the issue of the possible tainting of a con-
fession under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doc-
trine is not important unless it is sufficiently
74 Id. at 209. (Emphasis added.) The dissenter would
hold the evidence inadmissible because "it resulted-
more directly from knowledge obtained through subse-
quent illegal action of the police." Id. at 218.
75 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478
(1963).
76 "The owner of the records is entitled to be as well
off as if Flattery had not unlawfully seized those papers,
but he is not entitled to be any better off. He is not
entitled to gain perpetual immunity .... " Lord v.
Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 684,691 (D. Mass. 1963).
77 See opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961), for a comprehensive
discussion of the meaning of the term "voluntariness?'
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voluntary to be admissible under the rules per-
taining to confessions. As we have seen, the de-
fendant must take the initiative in raising a search
and seizure issue by showing a probability that
the allegedly tainted evidence is the product of
the unlawful act. How does he make such a show-
ing with regard to a statement which, by definition,
was made of his own free wtill and volition? If he
does establish a prima facie case for inadmissibility,
how can the prosecution carry its burden of es-
tablishing that the illegal act was not a sine qua
non of the statement being made? How can the
motivation that induced the statement be estab-
lished apart from the testimony of its maker? If
the defendant does testify that he made the state-
ment only because of the prior unlawful act, how
can the prosecution prove the contrary?
In one type of situation it is relatively simple to
establish that a confession of the defendant, no
matter how voluntarily made, is the product of an
illegal search. It is not uncommon for an individual
who is present while his home is being searched,
lawfully or otherwise, to make remarks to the
searchers during the course of the search. Clearly,
any such remarks are the result of the search and,
if it is illegal, are tainted by it27 The difficult
problems arise with regard to statements made by
the defendant after the search or seizure has been
completed. Let us consider first the situation where
the police have interrogated the defendant in the
interval between the illegal act and the making of
the confession. Thereafter, we will take up the
case where there has been no such interrogation.
If the defendant establishes that he was the vic-
78 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)
(statements made by defendant when arrested in his
bedroom after illegal entry by police). Accord, Gibson v.
United States, 149 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 724 (1945) (confession made when narcotics
found); Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690
(D.C. Cir. 1940) (entry into home without warrant
while investigating hit-and-run offense; police made
purpose known and defendant admitted guilt); United
States v. Rutheiser, 203 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)
(illegal search of defendant's home for stolen goods;
defendant made incriminating remarks when goods
found). See also Brock v. United States, 223 F.2d 681
(5th Cir. 1955), where statements made by an awaken-
ing defendant in response to questions put to him by
agents illegally on his premises were held inadmissible
because involuntary. The facts also show a direct causal
connection with the illegal entry.
However, if the statement of the defendant is made
as part of the commission of a crime unrelated to that
under investigation by the searchers, the exclusionary
rule does not apply. United States v. Morrison, 10
U.S.C.M.A. 525, 28 C.M.R. 91 (1959) (evidence of offer
of bribe by defendant to searchers made during illegal
search held admissible).
tim of an illegal search or seizure, that within a
reasonable time thereafter he was interrogated
about an offense to which the illegal act was rele-
vant, and that such interrogation resulted in his
making a statement, it would seem that he has
made a prima facie showing that the confession is
the product of and tainted by the illegal act. The
confession then is inadmissible unless the prosecu-
tion removes the taint by showing that the illegal
act was not the sole effective cause of the confes-
sion. The most effective means of accomplishing
this would be to show that the search had been
completely fruitless, producing no information
whatsoever, and thus there could be no causal
connection between the search and the confession.
Let us suppose, however, that although the
search did result in the discovery of evidence
highly incriminating to the defendant, the prose-
cution is able to establish that even if the search
had not occurred they wodd have interrogated
the defendant on the basis of information already
in their possession from lawful sources. Such a
showing would eliminate the illegal search as the
sole producing agent of the interrogation itself,
and on this state of the record, the confession
should be held not to be tainted. Thus, in Harlow
v. United States," any taint upon the defendant's
confession resulting from a showing that he was
interrogated after federal agents illegally inter-
cepted certain letters was removed by prosecution
evidence that, prior to the interception, the agents
had information which in and of itself warranted
the interrogation. In the language of the court,
"The investigating agents were not forever pre-
cluded from interrogating McLane and pressing
him to confess merely because they thereafter il-
legally seized other evidence tending to implicate
McLane in the bribery scheme."' 0 In Harlow the
untainted information was actually known to the
interrogators prior to the illegal act. In United
States v. Ellwein,81 the United States Court of
Military Appeals was confronted with a classic
situation for the application of the sine qua non
test. There, the unlawful monitoring of certain
telephone lines led to the arrest of the accused in
the very act of making an obscene call. There was
no doubt that the illegal act was the sole factual
cause of both the arrest and the interrogation
which immediately followed it. However, the pros-
ecution was able to establish that in the routine
79 301 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962).
80 Id. at 373.
81 6 U.S.C.M.A. 25, 19 C.M.R. 151 (1955).
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course of investigation the agents would have come
across information giving sufficient cause to suspect
the accused and to require that he be interrogated.
The court found this evidence sufficient to render
the interrogation untainted, saying that the ac-
cused "would ultimately have been interviewed by
law enforcement officers regarding the obscene
phone calls which had been the subject of com-
plaint.
' 2
Assuming that the prosecution thus succeeds in
removing the taint from the mere fact of interroga-
tion, what if the defendant then establishes that
the interrogators made use of the illegally obtained
information during the interrogation, as, for ex-
ample, by displaying to him highly incriminating
items with a demand that he explain his possession
of them or by using information gained during the
search as a basis for questions? The presence or
absence of this factor is highly significant in de-
termining whether the confession is tainted. Once
it has been established that the interrogation is
not per se tainted, only one question remains to
be answered, viz., Did the agents use the improp-
erly obtained information or evidence to obtain
the confession? We must not forget that the pur-
pose of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine is
to prevent the government from "using" the il-
legally acquired matter. The doctrine was first
announced by the Supreme Court in these words:
"The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisi-
tion of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the
court, but that it shall not be wed at all."13 The
test then for determining whether evidence is de-
rived from illegally obtained information is whether
the latter was used to obtain the former.
The determination of whether the improperly
obtained information was used to obtain the con-
fession requires that two inquiries be made. First,
was it used at all, and second, if it was used, did
the confession result from its use? The first inquiry
poses no substantial legal problems. It is relatively
simple to decide whether items obtained through
an illegal search or seizure were displayed to the
defendant or his attention otherwise directed to
them during his interrogation. Somewhat more
difficult is the determination as to whether illegally
obtained information was used as a basis for spe-
cific lines of interrogation even though the ques-
tions themselves made no specific reference to such
2 Id. at 31, 19 C.M.R. at 157.
61 Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1920). (Emphasis added.)
information. However, resort to the same princi-
ples governing the burden of persuasion that apply
elsewhere in this particular area of the law fur-
nishes the solution to this particular problem. If
the defendant establishes that a certain line of in-
qui'ry reasonably could have been based upon
tainted information, the prosecution must then
satisfy the court that the questions were based
upon lawfully obtained information. Thus, in Wig-
gins v. United States,"4 the defendant, charged with
tax evasion, claimed that his confession was tainted
because his interrogators used as a basis for their
questions information gained by a study of his
illegally seized records, but his claim was rejected
upon a showing by the prosecution that the agents
had received the same information from a lawful
source.85
Let us assume, however, that the undisputed
evidence shows that the tainted information or
objects were in fact used by the interrogators. In
such a situation the confession bears the same
taint and is inadmissible unless the prosecution
can establish that such use was not the sole effec-
tive cause of the confession being made.8  It can
discharge this burden by showing that the con-
fession had another, and lawful, cause. Thus, in a
case where the defendant claimed that his confes-
sion to the possession of stolen goods was tainted
because his interrogators made use of their knowl-
edge that the goods had been found in his home
during an illegal search, the court was able to find
that the confession was the product not of this
circumstance but rather of the confrontation of the
defendant by the one who had sold the goods to
him. "This statement has no apparent connection
with the illegally seized evidence and stems from
Rutheiser's alleged purchase of stolen goods from
Jones. This statement was based upon facts devel-
oped independently of the illegal search .... "
It is of great importance to note that, as a practi-
14 64 F.2d 950 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 657
(1933).
8- "lIt should be noted that the officials had received
similar information from defendant's secretary; this -
alone sufficed as a basis for their questions." Id. at 951.
Accord, Hollingsworth v. United States, 321 F.2d 342
(10th Cir. 1963). (Contraband rifle seized during illegal
search of automobile. Defendant confessed when ques-
tioned about it. Prosecution established that prior to
the search, the agents had been informed that defendant
possessed the weapon.)
88 For an example of the use of illegally obtained in-
formation as a basis for questions see Brock v. United
States, 223 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955).




cal matter, the prosecution frequently has the as-
sistance, however reluctant, of the defendant in
carrying its burden of proof in this area. The crucial
factor in resolving the issue of what in fact caused
the defendant to make his statement is his own
motive, to which he himself is obviously the best
witness. Although he cannot be called as a witness
on this matter by the prosecution, he has the
right to elect to testify on the limited issue of the
admissibility of his statement. If he remains silent,
although the court is not permitted to draw any
inferences from his silence, he runs the risk that a
showing by the prosecution that his statement-at
this point apparently completely voluntary-was
probably the result of some factor other than the
use of tainted information, will satisfy the court
that it is admissible. However, if he elects to at-
tack the prima facie showing of voluntariness by
testifying on that issue, and it is common knowl-
edge that such an attack rarely succeeds unless
the defendant does so testify, he opens himself to
cross-examination on all the circumstances sur-
rounding the interrogation, including specific ques-
tions concerning the influence upon him of the il-
legally obtained information. Furthermore, in order
to establish involuntariness, if such be his purpose,
he must seek to show that some misconduct of the
interrogators, such as duress, the making of prom-
ises of benefit, etc., was the principal producing
cause of the statement. In so doing, he necessarily
tends to weaken any prior showing that the state-
ment was the product of the illegal search or seizure.
On the other hand, if he attempts to strengthen
the evidence tending to show that the statement is
the fruit of the poisonous tree, he pro tanto weak-
ens any showing of involuntariness. If he attempts
to testify that the statement is both involuntary
and tainted, he necessarily undermines to some
extent both assertions. These are factors that must
be considered very carefully by defense counsel in
advising his client on whether or not to testify on
these issues.
When the accused does testify as to the manner
in which his statement was obtained, a failure on
his part to make a specific assertion that he con-
fessed solely because of the use by his interrogators
of the unlawfully obtained information is given
great significance. Thus, in Harlow v. United
States,83 the defendant testified that during his in-
terrogation the agents informed him that they al-
ready had much incriminating evidence against
88 301 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962).
him because they had intercepted certain letters
between his co-conspirators. In holding his confes-
sion nonetheless admissible the court placed great
stress upon his failure to testify to why he made
the statement, saying: "McLane did not indicate
that he would not have confessed if he had not
been told of the interceptions of Wilson's mail by
the investigating agents. For all we know, McLane
would have told all regardless of whether this infor-
mation was imparted to him by the investigating
agents." 89 A similar approach is found in Gibson v.
United States.90 There, the accused's confession as
to one narcotics charge had been suppressed and
the charge dismissed because of an illegal search of
his home which had resulted in the discovery of
the drugs involved. However, a confession as to a
second narcotics charge was held untainted even
though he had made it while in custody immedi-
ately after the illegal search. At that time he was
asked by the police if he knew anything about a
cache of drugs at another address, and he gave
them a detailed statement about it. At the trial
his only testimony concerning this second confes-
sion was that he had made it voluntarily. The
court noted: "Why he volunteered this informa-
tion [the second confession] does not appear ....
[W]e think that fact [the illegal arrest] does not
require the rejection of evidence volunteered by
him for reasons sufficient to himself and made
without force or compulsion or promise of re-
ward."91
It seems that in this latter limited area, the
sine qua non test for admissibility also governs,
but with one very significant change. Elsewhere in
the principles which have evolved with regard to
the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, it is neces-
sary for the defendant to establish only a probable
causal connection between the illegal act and the
proffered evidence. The prosecution must then as-
sume the burden of proving that the illegal act
was not the sole effective cause of the acquisition
of the evidence.9' However, when the issue is what
motivated the accused to confess, the allocation of
the burdens is reversed. The prosecution need es-
" Id.at 373.
88 149 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 724
(1945).
91 Id. at 384.
"2 As in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,491
(1963), where the record showed no more than that after
having been illegally arrested, Wong Sun was released
on his own recognizance after a lawful arraignment. He
then returned to the police of his own volition several
days later and made a statement.
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tablish only that the tainted information or evi-
dence probably was not the sole effective cause of
the accused's confession, and the defendant then
has the burden of proving otherwise. Although the
reported cases fail to discuss the reasons for this
reversal, it is not difficult to explain it. A confession
is never admissible unless the prosecution estab-
lishes that it was made voluntarily by the accused.
Such a showing tends in and of itself also to show
that the confession was not the product of the
tainted evidence. Furthermore, even with regard
to the issue of voluntariness, the prosecution is
not given the almost impossible task of showing
what actually did influence the accused to confess.
It is required, in the first instance, only to establish
that the interrogators employed no improper means
during the interrogation. The accused is the best
witness as to his own motives, and there is no in-
justice in a rile which requires him, in this limited
area, to prove what his motive was in confessing
if he wishes to invoke the strong medicine of the
exclusionary rule.
There remains for consideration the possible
tainting effect of an illegal search or seizure upon a
subsequent confession when there has been no in-
terrogation of the defendant in the interim. It is
obvious that this situation can be presented to a
court for decision only if the defendant takes the
stand and testifies that he made the confession
solely because he knew that the authorities were in
possession or aware of the illegally obtained evi-
dence. Otherwise, there would be no showing what-
soever of any possible causal connection between
the illegal act and the confession. Let us assume
that he so testifies, that there is no evidence to the
contrary, and that his testimony is not rejected as
being inherently incredible but is accepted as true
by the court. In other words, let us assume that
the illegal act was in fact the sole effective cause of
the confession being made. Should the confession
be held tainted and excluded? I think not. As has
been pointed out earlier,93 so-called derivative evi-
3 See text accompanying note 83 supra.
dence is excluded because government officials are
not permitted to "use" the illegally obtained evi-
dence in developing their case against the defend-
ant. In the situation now before us there has been
no use whatsoever by the authorities, and the rea-
son for the application of the exclusionary rule
disappears. The factor motivating the defendant is
his anxiety, or pangs of conscience, arising from
his knowledge that the police are aware of his un-
lawful activities. One could say with deceptive sim-
plicity that the defendant is charged with knowl-
edge of the fact that the investigators cannot
make use of their illegally obtained information
and, therefore, that there is no causal connection
between the search and the confession. A more
realistic approach would be to recognize that the
purposes of the exclusionary rule would be ill
served by extending it to cover this situation. The
rule simply is not designed for the purpose of giv-
ing the victim of an illegal search immunity against
prosecution for all crimes uncovered by the search.
The sole purpose of the rule is to deter unlawful
actions by police officers and thereby benefit soci-
ety as a whole. This deterrence is accomplished by
forbidding the se of unlawfully acquired informa-
tion as a means of law enforcement and criminal
investigation.
CONCLUSION
The federal exclusionary rule, including the
fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, is now "the
law of the land," binding on all criminal courts,
federal and state alike. Prosecutors and defenders
should be thoroughly familiar with the principles
involved in its application. The reported cases in-
dicate that attorneys for the defense are well
aware of the existence of the rule and its potentiali-
ties. One hopes that prosecutors will be equally
aware of the many ways in which the tainted fruit
can be unpoisoned and thereby do their part to
avoid the perversion of a rule designed to protect
society as a whole into an unlimited gaol delivery
of criminals.
19641
